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I.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES,
To the best of Mr. Holbrook's knowledge, there are no

constitutional

provisions,

statues,

ordinances,

rules

or

regulations whose interpretation is solely determinative of the
issues in this appeal.

II.

REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT.
1.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT MR. HOLBROOK'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REQUESTING FIREMASTER TO
BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM AND PAY FOR A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
ACCOUNTING UNDER THE CONTRACTS.
Firemaster replied with three reasons why in its view the

accounting fees of Mr. Miller should not have been awarded to Mr.
Holbrook.

All three reasons are without substance.

All three of

Firemaster's arguments ignore the substance of the obligation of
Firemaster to provide a fair and impartial accounting raised in Mr.
Holbrook's appeal of this issue. Firemaster only argued the remedy
suggested by Mr. Holbrook.
The first reason set forth by Firemaster why the remedy
suggested by Mr. Holbrook is not appropirate is, it claims Mr.
Holbrook should have made a motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) for revision of the entry of the judgment, based
upon the

jury verdict

finding the existence

of a fiduciary

relationship.
What Firemaster ignores is that Mr. Holbrook made a
motion for declaratory and other post trial relief, including to
1

receive his attorneys' fees, costs and the accounting fees of Mr.
Miller. (R. 3143-3354).

While not entitled specifically a Rule

54(b) motion, in fact, after trial Mr. Holbrook did specifically
request the court to award his accounting

fees.

The final

judgments in this case reflect the Court's disposition of such
requests

(R.

3882-3891)(See

addendum

hereto,

Exhibit

A).

Therefore, Mr. Holbrook has done specifically that which Firemaster
suggests he should have done, and his request was erroneously
denied by the Trial Court.

There was no waiver by Mr. Holbrook.

There was only a denial by the Trial Court and therefore this
appeal request for rectification of that error is appropriate.
Next, Firemaster argues that the $50,000 award, which
Firemaster seeks to have vacated, has compensated Mr. Holbrook for
his accounting fees.

This is a meritless

argument

for the

following reasons.
By stipulation

of the parties, no evidence of Mr.

Holbrook's accounting fees were ever submitted to the Jury, (Tr.
at R. 429 6-97) so it is impossible to say that the Jury took into
account Mr. Miller's fees in making the $50,000 award to Mr.
Holbrook. A review of Firemaster's argument on this issue clearly
shows no reference in the record to Mr. Miller's accounting fees
until the post trial motions were made. (R. 3143-3354). Where the
jury had no evidence of Mr. Miller's fees, argument by Firemaster
that they were part of the $50,000 award is totally meritless.
In fact, the $158,206 paid by Mr. Holbrook for Paragraph
8 services that he testified to at Trial also did not contain the
2

amount of Mr. Miller's accounting fees. (R. 4521, 5668; Plaintiff's
Trial Exhibits 11 & 34).

Firemaster has shown no place in the

record where the Jury was provided Mr. Miller's fees, because such
a reference does not exist. For that reason, Firemaster's argument
that the award of the accounting fees would present a double
recovery has no basis in fact or in the record.
Finally, Firemaster's third argument (converse to its
previous argument) admits the truth, which is that Mr. Miller's
accounting fees were not submitted as evidence to the jury.
Firemaster claims that this defect makes any award of such fees
impossible.

However, by stipulation of the parties both sides

agreed to submit their costs and attorneys' fees to the Court posttrial based upon the their view of the final findings of the Jury
(Tr. at R. 4296-97).
After trial, Mr. Holbrook did request of this Court Mr.
Miller's accounting fees and the Court had the evidence before it.
(R. 3343-3349). Therefore, while the Jury did not receive evidence
of Mr. Miller's costs and fees, the Trial Court did have the
opportunity to award those fees to Mr. Holbrook under his requests
for post trial relief. (R. 3143-3354). The denial of such requests
is part of Mr. Holbrook's appeal.

The awarding of Mr. Miller's

fees is an appropriate remedy for the Trial Court's failure to
grant Mr. Holbrook's well founded motion for an accounting. (R.
974-991, 1060-1298; 1419-1435).
In denying Mr. Holbrook's motion for an accounting, the
Trial Court ignored the obvious structure of the relationship
3

between the parties set up by Firemaster wherein it received all
revenues and was paid, under contracts it drafted, to account for
such revenues.
Section 8).

(See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 1, 2, and 3,

No material question of fact ever existed on the

following issues either before trial or after:
A.

Firemaster drafted all the contracts.

B. The contracts required Firemaster to receive all proceeds
from all sales and services Mr. Holbrook performed. (Plaintiff's
Trial Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, Section 8).
C. All sales and services performed on accoimt were assigned
to

Firemaster

(for

examples

see

the

lower

left

corner

of

Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 113, 114, 115, 116).
D.

Firemaster required all the documentation from sales and

services by Mr. Holbrook to be maintained by Firemaster, and kept
such documentation locked up. (Tr. at R. 4700-4703).
E.

Mr. Holbrook paid Firemaster substantial revenues, up to

47% of each sale under contracts prepared by Firemeister, to perform
accounting services for Mr. Holbrook. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit
1, 2, and 3, Section 8).
Firemaster had possession and control of all funds and
documents.

Firemaster was paid handsomely

Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34).

to account.

(See

Yet the Trial Court did

not require Firemaster to pay for a fair and impartial accounting.
Mr. Holbrook had to pay Firemaster for accounting services for two
and one-half years.

Then Mr. Holbrook had to pay Mr. Miller to

review and analyze what Firemaster did.
4

Mr. Holbrook proved

Firemaster

tortiously

converted

his

contracts and did so in bad faith.

funds, breached

all the

(R. at 2729-2737, 2743-47,

2759-62) See addendum hereto, Exhibit B. Yet the Trial Court did
not require Mr. Holbrook

to be

reimbursed

for Mr. Miller's

substantial and expensive work. (See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 2232, 101-4182, and Tr. at R. 4768-4781, 5258-5279).
The acceptance of the Section 8 responsibilities of the
contracts by Firemaster, and its actual possession of all the
funds, created a duty in Firemaster to fairly and accurately
account for the cash and receivables of the parties. See Simper v.
Scorup, 1 P.2d 1941 (Utah 1931); Keeble v. Brown, et. al, 266 P.2d
569 (Col. 1954); Towers v. Titus, et. al. , 5 B.R. 786 (N.D. Cal.
1979); and Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, et. al., 489 F. Supp. 354
(Utah 1977).

The case of Gonsalves v. Hodgson, 237 P.2d 656

(Calif. 1951) also supports this position. Firemaster demanded the
funds by contracts it drafted. It just hates having the associated
duties.

The jury recognized this in finding a fiduciary duty on

the part of Firemaster and in assessing conversion and punitive
damages against Firemaster. (Addendum, Exhibit B ) .
In the extent case, Firemaster gladly, by contracts it
prepared, took on the duties of accounting and was paid well to do
so.

The reality and substance of the relationship between the

parties clearly overrides any generalized argument by Firemaster
that no duty to account existed. Firemaster had the paperwork, the
funds

and

was

paid

to

account.

Firemaster

had

a

solemn

responsibility which it was found by a trier of fact to have
5

violated.

The facts regarding those duty issues have always been

uncontroverted.

The only thing controverted was Firemaster's

desire to be held to account and the results of an accounting.

No

genuine issue of fact has ever existed on any of the material
issues.

This Court must find Firemaster had the legal duty to

account when it had the cash, the paperwork and was paid to
account.

To provide Mr. Holbrook the minimal offset of his fees

incurred for hiring an outside accountant is the minimum award that
Mr. Holbrook should receive as a result of Firemaster's breaches
of it's duties to him.

2.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FIREMASTER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS MR. HOLBROOK'S STATE AND FEDERAL RACKETEERING CLAIMS.
A.

Firemaster stated on pgs. 26-27 of it's Brief:

"Although the Franchisor concedes that the Trial court's
decision to dismiss the racketeering claim solely on the
choice of law provision is not, by itself, defensible."

Based upon this statement by Firemaster and the arguments
set forth in the first brief of Mr. Holbrook on this issue, it is
unquestioned

that

the

decision

to

dismiss

Mr.

Holbrook's

racketeering claims by the Trial Court should be reversed and
remanded for a trial on such issues.
Firemaster seeks to remedy the erroneous legal decision
by the Trial Court by setting forth in its reply the same arguments
that were rejected below. (R. 198-221, 560-582, 713-737A, 811-841,
6

844-852, 1458-1481, 1529-159 6, 1606-1617, 1618-1620, 162 6-1638,
1671-1674).
Firemaster sets forth on Pages 2 6 through 28 of it's
brief a generalized
racketeering.
Court.

argument of the

law concerning pleading

These arguments were not persuasive for the Trial

(R. 1671-74, see addendum hereto, Exhibit C ) .

In fact,

these arguments of Firemaster were specifically rejected by Judge
Brian by his deletion of those grounds from the order prepared by
counsel for Firemaster. (R. 1673).
Mr. Holbrook set forth in his Second Amended Complaint
multiple specific allegations of wrong-doing by Firemaster and it's
individual officers and employees under two separate racketeering
causes of action which were dismissed on the same grounds. (R.
1332-1365).
The allegation's in the Second Amended Complaint set
forth by Mr. Holbrook were sufficient for the Jury in this case to
find Firemaster had breached it's contracts and fiduciary duty to
Mr. Holbrook, that Firemaster had done so in bad faith, that it
had tortiously converted his funds and justified the imposition of
punitive damages. (Addendum, Exhibit B) .

Tortious conversion of

money is clearly the civil version of theft, a viable and valid
racketeering charge.
Yet for some reason, when the rules of procedure require
applying a supposedly lesser standard of burden of proof relating
to pleadings than that which a jury must meet, the Trial Court
apparently

construed the pleadings
7

against Mr. Holbrook

(the

respondent) and in favor of Firemaster (the petitioner). The lower
Court could not find for Firemaster on the substantive racketeering
arguments, despite all it's attempts to cause specific dismissal
of Mr. Holbrook's racketeering claims for the arguments set forth
by Firemaster in its Appeal brief.

Instead, the Trial Court chose

a basis for dismissal that Firemaster itself now admits is not
defensible.
The lower court tacitly admitted that Mr. Holbrook's
allegations were well pled because

it chose to dismiss

the

racketeering claims on the very narrow grounds that are now
admittedly not defensible and did not dismiss them on the specific
grounds as now argued by Firemaster. (R. 1673) (Addendum, Exhibit
C).

Where the Trial Court did not dismiss the racketeering claims

on the specific grounds argued now by Firemaster, this Court
cannot, in effect, grant a motion not before it by upholding an
order for different grounds than found below.

The narrow "out"

argued by Firemaster from the case of Bagshaw v. Bagshaw, 788 P.2d
1057 (Utah App. 1990) is not applicable here.

No other valid

grounds for dismissal existed, either before or now.

This error

should be rectified by a reversal of the Trial Court's order and
a remand for further proceedings.

B.
concerning

Firemaster
pleading

replied with a generalized

racketeering

with

particularity

argument
without

reference to any specific section of the Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint to show how or why the allegations therein were not
8

sufficiently pled with particularity.
the

generalized

argument.

legal

theory

Mr. Holbrook does not deny

espoused

by

Firemaster

in

its

Firemaster's problem is, the Second Amended Complaint

contains an overabundance of particulars, and Firemaster has not
addressed any. Without Firemaster identifying issues allegedly not
sufficiently particularized, it is not possible to respond with
particularity to its argument.

It should be sufficient to note

that Firemaster made the same argument regarding particularity
regarding Mr. Holbrook's fraud claim, but ended up dropping that
argument regarding the Second Amended Complaint, clearly because
of the abundance of particulars. (R. at 1458-81).

C.

Firemaster claims that the necessary "enterprise"

was not alleged by Mr. Holbrook. In so doing, Firemaster is simply
ignoring the obvious facts and law.
As set forth in the Second Amended Complaint (R. 1332,
1357), and in the arguments of Mr. Holbrook in opposition to
Firemaster's motion to dismiss in the trial court (R. 1532-37),
Mr. Holbrook and his business is cited as the enterprise necessary
for a racketeering claim. Firemaster's only address of this issue
comes on Page 31 of it's brief where it discounts, without any
support, the Plaintiff as the enterprise.

Firemaster does not

anywhere show why Mr. Holbrook cannot be the enterprise under Utah
Code Annotated Section 76-10-1602(1).
The
contractor

enterprise

area

and

is Mr. Holbrook

franchise

territories
9

in
as

his
set

independent
forth

in

Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit's "1", "2", and "3". As in the case of
Jacobsen v. Cooper, 882 F.2d

717

(2nd Cir. 1989), the court

indicated the Plaintiff had alleged a sufficient enterprise when
he stated that the enterprise consisted of his own real estate
investment and development company.

See also Haroco v. American

National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 767 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984).
Mr.

Holbrook's

organization
Firemaster.

business

based

upon

had

an

ascertainable

contracts

drafted

structure

specifically

and
by

Mr. Holbrook is the enterprise and this issue is

adequately pled by him.

D.

Mr. Holbrook more than adequately pled a pattern of

unlawful activity.
Mr. Holbrook both pled and presented evidence at Trial
of in excess of 1,000 instances where commissions were taken away
from him by Firemaster through an intentional pattern of taking.
(See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 101-4182).

A jury has already

found that taking to constitute tortious conversion of the funds
of Mr. Holbrook, justifying the imposition of punitive damages.
(Addendum, Exhibit B)
In it's argument on this issue, Firemaster only generally
alleges there is no pattern stated, but ignores the proven facts
of this case and the case of State v. McGrath 749 P.2d 631 (Utah
1988), which indicates that each particular sale of illegal drugs
constituted a separate criminal episode for purposes of meeting
the requisite pattern of a racketeering claim. Only three episodes
10

are needed to meet the racketeering pleading requirements.

Mr.

Holbrook pled over 150 specific instances of alleged unlawful
activity by providing the date, amount
regarding the specific unlawful activity.

and account

involved

Such references are

clearly sufficient to meet the "pattern" requirement based upon
State v. McGrath, supra law for purposes of pleading racketeering.
Mr. Holbrook clearly proved a sufficient "pattern" of
unlawful activity to convince a Jury that Firemaster was engaged
in tortious

conversion

of

his

commissions

on

a consistent,

systematic basis over a two and one-half year period of time. The
pleading of such "pattern" also meets the requirements of the
Sedima, S.P.R.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).

That case

indicates the factor of continuity plus relationship combining to
produce a pattern is what must exist for racketeering claims. This
is supported by the case of H. J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
The specific instances of taking pled in the Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint, (R. 1332-1365) clearly set forth a
specific

pattern

of

unlawful

activity

wherein

Firemaster

consistently, over time, took ever increasing amounts of Mr.
Holbrook's funds from the commissions he earned while associated
with Firemaster. (See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 22-32, 101-4182).
Firemaster has done nothing to explain how the illegal taking of
commissions in over 1,000 specific instances, over a two and onehalf year period, which was only stopped since Mr. Holbrook

11

terminated his relationship with Firemaster, fails to constitute
a pattern having continuity plus relationship.
The relationship is that all funds were handled by
Firemaster's accounting department,
collect the income it desired

as part of it's process to

(as contrasted to what it was

entitled to), that Firemaster was paid to account and that it
consistently wrongfully took excess commissions as testified to by
the various witnesses in the Trial.

For the purpose of making

pleading requirements, these were sufficiently set forth in the
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (R. 1332-1365).
All

Firemaster's

racketeering

claims

are

racketeering

law, but

arguments

generally

completely

against

accurate
ignore

the

Mr.

Holbrook's

statements
vast

about

number

of

specifics provided in the well-pled allegations of the Plaintiff's
Second Amended Complaint. (R. 1332-1365).

The facts are clear.

Firemaster knows the law, it just (as found by the Jury) decided
not to abide by the law.
This Court must find the Trial Court clearly erred in
dismissing Mr. Holbrook's racketeering claims, must reverse that
decision and the associated award of attorneys fees, and must
remand for further proceedings.

3.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE PLAINTIFF
TO PUT ON EVIDENCE AT TRIAL OF LOST PROFITS INCURRED AS A
RESULT OF THE WRONGFUL IMPOSITION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR ALTERNATIVELY TO PERMIT SUCH A DETERMINATION AS
PART OF MR. HOLBROOK'S POST-TRIAL MOTIONS FOR RELIEF.

12

The substantive issue regarding lost profits in this case
centers on whether the preliminary
entered.

At paragraph

injunction was wrongfully

139 of Mr. Holbrook's

second amended

complaint, he provided notice of a claim for damages relative to
the injunction

(R. 1369).

The Trial Court still refused Mr.

Holbrook to put on evidence of his lost profits. (Tr. at R. 53055310).
The

reason

Mr.

Holbrook

lost

profits

was

because

Firemaster obtained from the Trial Court an injunction that kept
him from working certain accounts after this litigation began. (R.
740-745, 1600-1603).

Had there been no injunction requested by

Firemaster, Mr. Holbrook could have mitigated his damages.
was no surprise on this issue.

There

The Trial Court totally failed to

explain the basis of how the injunction was not wrongfully entered,
given the jury verdicts finding that Mr. Holbrook fully performed
his contracts until he terminated in January of 1990 (R. 2729-37).
The case of Cohn v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 537 P.2d
306 (Utah 1975) clearly holds that damages such as lost profits,
which clearly and obviously flow from a wrong need not be pled
specifically.

No clearer situation could exist for lost profits

than Firemaster obtaining a court order to keep Mr. Holbrook from
working. Mr. Holbrook complied with the Court's order and did not
work the accounts which were the subject of the injunction. He now
is penalized for his compliance with the Court's order by its
refusal to either award him damages or permit consideration of
damages for not working such accounts.
13

The Trial Court should have followed the result of the
case of Wright v. West Side Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990)
where the Trial Court correctly applied the law to the facts by
recognizing the prior breaches of the agreement between the parties
justified the non-breaching party from performing further under
such contract, and terminating any further obligation to perform
by the aggrieved party.

See also Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210

(Utah App. 1988) .
It is the duty of the jury to find facts and the Court
to apply the law. Briaham v. Moon Lake Elec. Assoc, 470 P.2d 393
(Utah 1970).

The Court should have reviewed the special jury

verdicts and as a matter of law should have resolved the crucial
inconsistencies based upon Mr. Holbrook's

clear and

contract performance over two and one-half years.

complete

Had the Trial

Court correctly done so, Mr. Holbrook would have been permitted to
have either the Judge or Jury consider his request for lost profits
because the wrongfulness of the injunction would be clear.
The Trial Court failed to apply the law to correctly
resolve the affairs between these parties leaving Mr. Holbrook to
still be responsible, after January of 1990, to Firemaster in some
respects, after all its intentionally tortious acts toward him.
Once the unquestioned chronology of the facts in this case and the
law have been correctly applied to eliminate each and every further
obligation on the part of Mr. Holbrook to perform under the
contracts after January of 1990, the decision of the Trial Court
that the injunction was not wrongfully entered becomes clearly
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erroneous and must be reversed.

Such a conclusion will thereby

justify an award of damages based upon Mr. Holbrook's pleading set
forth at paragraph 139 of the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint
(R. 1369-70); upon Mr. Holbrook's request for post trial relief (R.
3198-3201) or a remand for further proceedings on this issue.

4. THE AWARD TO MR. HOLBROOK OF ONLY $5,872.36 IN PUNITIVE
DAMAGES WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHERE THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED
TO PERMIT EVIDENCE OF FIREMASTER'S NET WORTH TO GO TO THE
JURY.
Firemaster argues the failure to submit evidence of the
financial net worth of Firemaster to the Jury is fatal to Mr.
Holbrook's claim for recovery of any additional punitive damages.
Mr. Holbrook sought to have that financial information submitted
to the Jury.

Firemaster objected and the Court sustained the

objection. (Tr. at R. 5442-5443).
The Court did make a statement the information could be
considered at a later time (R. 5443).

However, there was no later

time provided by the Court and the special Jury Verdict form that
was approved by both sides and the Court went to the Jury with the
authorization to the Jury to award punitive damages without further
instruction by the Court or further evidence. (R. 2743-2745).
Where Mr. Holbrook sought to have the financial statement
of Firemaster admitted and was denied that right by the Court,
based upon the objection of Firemaster, it is clearly prejudicial
at this time to say that the Jury did not have such evidence based
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on the failure of Mr. Holbrook to submit it.

He attempted to do

so and was denied that right by the Court as set forth above.
What really happened, as recognized by the Trial Court
in it's statements in post-trial motions (Tr. at R.5794-5803), was
that the parties and the Court permitted the Special Jury Verdicts
authorizing an award of punitive damages to go to the Jury without
the bifurcation as required under Utah Code Annotated Section 7818-1

(1) and

(2).

This statutory procedure was not clearly

delineated or followed by the Court and parties, resulting in an
award of punitive damages that does not reflect the Jury's proper
considerations of all material issues. See e.g. Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), Bundy v. Century Equipment
Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) and Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766
(Utah 1985).
When

his

issue

was

argued

below, the

Trial

Court

correctly addressed the problem. (Tr. at R. 5797-5803)
The only realistic solution is for a new trial to proceed
on the issue as to what is the correct amount of punitive damages.
See Bundv, supra.

Firemaster's only argument on this subject is

that such an approach is impractical and a waste of judicial time.
Had Firemaster permitted the financial evidence to go to
a jury in the prior trial, a new trial might not be required.
was

Firemaster

and

the

Trial

Court

that

chose

to

It

defer

consideration of the financial condition of Firemaster to a later
date if an award of punitive damages was found to be appropriate.
Such an award was found to be appropriate.
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The Jury received a

special verdict form approved by all the parties and the Court that
instructed them to proceed to award punitive damages (R. 27432745).
Without correction of this error no permissible punitive
damage award to Plaintiff based on the evidence will exist in this
case.

While judicial economy may be important, error that was

created in large part by the defendant and the Court, should not
be the basis for denying a Plaintiff his right to receive the
correct amount of damages awardable by a fact finder.
5.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING MR.
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOV, AND/OR
DECLARATORY RELIEF, STRIKING THE JURY VERDICT TO
FOR BREACH OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS OF THE

HOLBROOK'S
MOTION FOR
FIREMASTER
CONTRACTS.

The key issue in this entire case, that will resolve a
myriad of the problems argued by both sides, is how a person such
as Mr. Holbrook must act relative to contracts, when he has fully
performed them for two and one-half years, and then discovers the
other

party

breaching

has been

such

repeatedly

contracts

during

intentionally
the

same

and

period

willfully
of

time.

Firemaster argues that Mr. Holbrook should have ongoing obligations
of confidentiality because the contracts were divisible on the
issues of Firemaster's duties versus Mr. Holbrook's duties.
The jury specifically answered this issue by finding the
obligations of Mr. Holbrook should be terminated and he should not
be required to perform further because of Firemaster's actions (R.
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2759-60, Addendum, Exhibit B).

The Court agreed separately after

trial (R. 4844-46).
The jury also found Mr. Holbrook fully performed his
obligations under the contracts until the time he terminated his
relationship with Firemaster (R. 2729-37).

The chronology of this

case falls entirely and completely in Mr. Holbrook's favor.

The

accounting exhibits and testimony of Mr. Miller clearly establish
the willful conversion by Firemaster (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits
22-32, 101-4182, Tr. at R. 4768-81, 5258-79).
The issue the Court left unresolved, is whether, as a
matter of law, Firemaster could continue to require Mr. Holbrook's
performance on his contractual obligations of confidentiality.
This was an issue of law for the Court to decide. It did so decide
only after a fashion. (R. 3890-91).

Because the Trial Court did

not deal with the issues which were part of the above referenced
motions denied by the Trial Court, this is now an appeal issue.
Firemaster

claims

contracts were divisible.

that

the

obligations

under

the

Firemaster still seeks, because the

Trial Court did not clarify the obligations of the parties by
striking the award of damages to Firemaster, to retain some right
to compensation

from Mr. Holbrook under

contracts Firemaster

repeatedly (over 1,000 times), intentionally violated.

Such a

result should not be tolerated by the Courts of this state.

See

Wright and Kinsman, supra.
This case provides a crystal clear fact situation.
specific time periods are involved.
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Two

Mr. Holbrook fully performed

his obligations under the contracts from June of 1987 through
January of 1990. No evidence exists to the contrary and the jury
so found.

(R. 2729-37).

After January of 1990, Mr. Holbrook

became not a franchisee, but a competitor, of Firemaster.

The

question that remains is, can Firemaster do what the jury found it
to have done, and still require Mr. Holbrook to perform his duties
under the contracts after January of 1990. The Kinsman and Wright,
supra, cases say no. They say such a result will not be tolerated.
This Holbrook v. Master Protection case should say the same and Mr.
Holbrook's appeal on this issue should be upheld.

If that occurs,

most other issues in this appeal then can be made consistent and
sensible.

6.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD MR.
HOLBROOK HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY
IN THIS ACTION AND UNDER THE STANDARDS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
SECTION 78-27-56.
If the threshold question as set forth by Mr. Holbrook
is properly decided,1 then the $10,000 award and the equitable
payment to Firemaster will be vacated, and it becomes clear Mr.
Holbrook is the prevailing party in this litigation. Without such
a decision, this case may present a "mixed bag" of results.
Firemaster's entire reply argument on this issue is that
the results of the case constitute such a "mixed bag" of results,
the prevailing party cannot be identified.

By answering correctly

And if Mr. Holbrook prevails on his appeal regarding the
racketeering claims, thus vacating the attorneys fee award to
Firemaster.
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the threshold question of Mr. Holbrook's duties after January 30,
1990, the "mixed bag" theory of Firemaster is answered and rejected
in full. Firemaster has provided the Court and Jury with adequate
grounds for them to find that it acted in a willful and malicious
manner in the tortious taking of Mr. Holbrook's commissions.

A

correction of the lower court's errors on these issues would
resolve all questions concerning the prevailing party in this
action.
Firemaster's
Holbrook,

actions

in failing to

in refusing to account to Mr.

ever pay

for

a fair

and

impartial

accounting, in failing to ever present in court that such an
accounting was done, its lack of good faith found by the fury and
the finding of conversion of Mr. Holbrook's assets is sufficient
evidence, under the standard of Cady v. Johnson, 671 P. 2d 149 (Utah
1983) regarding fraud and wrong-doing, to award Mr. Holbrook his
fees under Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.
Firemaster's actions as found by the jury (Addendum,
Exhibit B hereto), are sufficient to award Mr. Holbrook his fees
and costs under the contracts, if the threshold question as stated
by Mr. Holbrook is properly answered.
A failure by this Court to award costs and attorneys'
fees against Firemaster is in fact a victory for Firemaster and
will

permit

Firemaster

in the

future

to

steal

their

other

franchisees' commissions, knowing that it can economically outlast
such parties throughout the Court process without ever risking
having to pay their victims' attorneys' fees. The failure to award
20

costs and attorneys' fees to Mr* Holbrook in this case grants
Firemaster a license of impunity to willfully and maliciously steal
commissions from it's independent contractors and franchisees.
This Court must not permit such a result. Firemaster must pay Mr.
Holbrook's costs and attorneys' fees.

7.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING MR. HOLBROOK TO
PAY $11,014.00 IN CASH AS AN "EQUITABLE" PAYMENT TO FIREMASTER
FOR ACCESS TO THE CONFIDENTIAL CUSTOMER LIST WHERE MR.
HOLBROOK WAS FOUND TO HAVE FULLY PERFORMED HIS OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE CONTRACTS.

Firemaster admits that the "equitable" payment imposed
by the Court was erroneous (page 21 of it's brief), wherein it
stated:
"Charitably stated, the Trial Court's action was
unorthodox and unsolicited.
At a minimum, the Trial
Court should be required to explain why it applied a
remedy that neither party requested...."

Mr. Holbrook asserts that the Court need not explain.
The issue is simply so erroneous that it must be vacated because
there is no justification for it, in fact or in law.
Once the threshold

issue of Mr. Holbrook's ongoing

obligations under the contracts after two and one-half years of
fully performing his obligations and after Firemaster's two and
one-half years of intentional breaches, is answered by dismissing
any and all further obligations by Mr. Holbrook under the contracts
after January of 1990, the issue of equitable relief to Firemaster
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of any kind is clearly answered, i.e. it deserves none.

Even

without answering the threshold question, that issue is already
clearly answered by virtue of findings of the jury that Firemaster
willfully and maliciously tortiously converted the funds of Mr.
Holbrook.

Equity cannot protect such a party.
See

the

case

of

Battistone

v.

American

Land

and

Development Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980) which indicates that a
court of equity will generally not assist one in extricating
himself from circumstances which he has created. (See pg. 839).
Firemaster put itself in the position where Mr. Holbrook could no
longer bear their tortious taking of his commissions and therefore
made him their competitor.
Firemaster

by

providing

A court of equity should not assist
it

relief

based

upon

circumstances

Firemaster itself created.
The case Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah
1980) indicates that prior to a party receiving equitable relief
it

must

exercise

reasonable

efforts

to

discharge

it's

own

obligation. Where there are clear findings of fact that Firemaster
failed to discharge it's obligations during the time period of June
1987 through January 1990, under the well settled law in the
Bradford, supra case, Firemaster has been found not to have
discharged it's duties and is therefore not entitled to equitable
relief from this

Court.

See also the case of Parks Enterprises,

Inc. v. New Century Reality, Inc., 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982).
January of 1990 is an absolute cut-off date of Mr.
Holbrook's obligations to Firemaster.
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In order to bring legal

clarity to the manner in which parties must relate to each other
in these type of contractual and business situations, this Court
must enter a clear and unequivocable statement indicating that once
a party has materially breached the contracts and tortiously
damaged the other party to it's business or contractual relations,
the injured party need not further perform and is justified in no
further performance of any of the contractual obligations.

If one

side ignores the contract, the other need not follow it either.
Therefore, this award to Firemaster of $11,014.00 must be vacated.

IX. CONCLUSION
Mr. Holbrook urges this Court to make sense for him of
the key issue of how he should act when he has honored his
contracts for two and one-half years, and then proved Firemaster
intentionally and willfully converted his commissions during the
entire time period. Mr. Holbrook honored his contracts. The jury
found this to be the case.

Firemaster wrongfully breached the

contracts, repeatedly and intentionally.
Mr. Holbrook's actions over time respectfully deserve
this Court's assistance in awarding him all appropriate relief and
in punishing Firemaster.
Mr. Holbrook deserves this Court to tell him he had no
obligation

to

Firemaster

after

January

of

1990

because

of

Firemaster's actions and to vacate any relief to Firemaster on
actions after that date that related to the contracts.
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Mr.

Holbrook deserves this Court to reverse errors

regarding the racketeering claims, punitive damages and the $11,014
award which the Court and opposing party have admitted were in
error. Mr. Holbrook respectfully requests this Court's assistance
in rectifying all these clear and prejudicial errors.
DATED this /bf^day of

-feja^q*—f

, 199 3.

Respectfully submitted,

ICHARD N. BIGELOW
9
^="
RICHARD
Attorney for Cross-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT to the following on this 16th day of
February, 1993.

John T. Anderson
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898

"$JUf • 6i
holbrook.rep
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

OCT 0 3 1991
Mel S. Martin (Bar No. 21C2)
Richard N. Bigelow (Bar Nc. 2?:-:
MARTIN & BIGELOW, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
900 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7332
IN THE THIRD JZ'ZZCZJ-JL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LA*Z CZT.~£ f STATE OF UTAH
BARD N. HOLBROOK,

~PGMENT ON COMPLAINT
:r PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,
vs.
MASTER PROTECTION CORPORATION,
dba FIREMASTER, California
Corporation, ROBIN PHILLIPS,
an individual, and JOHN DOES
1-20.

Civil No. 900900445CN
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Pat
B. Brian on February 4, 1991.

Plaimiff appeared by and through

his attorney Richard N. Bigelcv cf Xarrin & Bigelow, P.C.
Defendants appeared by and thrcugi rheir attorney, John T.
Anderson of Parsons, Behle & Lariner.
After a jury was enpanelei and opening statements made,
testimony and other evidence were imrcduced in support of the
respective cases of the parties.
The Court submitted Plaimiff fs claims for breach of
the three contracts between the parties, for fraud, for
conversion, for breach of fiduciary iu-y, for negligent
misrepresentation, for unjust enriciirar:-, for violations of

California Corporation's Code § 31Z35 er ssq., fcr quasi
contract, for breach of the implied ccvenan- cf good faith and
fair dealing and other special verdicrs regarding Plaintiff's
defenses to Defendant Firemaster's ciains re rhe jury and
submitted Defendants' counterclaims azair.sr Plair.riff for
improper interference with contractual reiariens, with breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, for
conversion and for breach of the cenfidentialiry provisions of
the written agreements to the jury,

Afrer rhe parties rested and

closing arguments were made, the jury, having been instructed
upon all matters of law and having rehired re deliberate upon its
verdict, did thereafter on February 12, 1931, rerurn to the Court
special verdicts which are attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and
incorporated herein by this reference.
After trial, additional issues were submitted to the
Court and resolved as set forth in orders cf rhe Court dated
April 8, 1991, and thereafter.
It appears that all clains bervsen rie parties have
been resolved and the matter now coming en fcr judgment upon the
following verdict, it is hereby:
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as fcllcvs:
1.

On Plaintiff's First Cause cf Azrrion for breach of

the Territory Agreement, Plaintiff shall be, and he hereby is,
granted judgment against Defendant Firenasrer in the principal
sum of $5,889.35, plus interest at the rare cf 12% per annum from
the date of entry of this judgment to the dare cf payment.

2.

Regarding Plaintiff's claim for breach of the

Franchise Agreement No, 1 regarding the Salt Lake City area,
Plaintiff shall be, and hereby is, granted judgment against
Defendant Firemaster in the principal sum of $1,00, plus interest
at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry of this
judgment to the date of payment.
3.

On Plaintiff's claim for breach of the Franchise

Agreement No. 2 for the Rural Utah Franchise, Plaintiff shall be,
and hereby is, granted a judgment against Defendant Firemaster
for breach of contract in the principal sum of $1.00, plus
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry of
this judgment to the date of payment.
4.

Plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees and costs

associated with this proceeding is denied.
5.

On Plaintiff's claim regarding fraud against

Defendant Firemaster and Defendant Robin Phillips, Defendant
Firemaster and Defendant Robin D. Phillips shall be, and hereby
are, granted a judgment of no cause of action against Plaintiff.
6.

On Plaintiff's cause of action for conversion,

Plaintiff shall be, and hereby is, granted judgment against
Defendant Firemaster in the principal sum of $30,032.71, and for
punitive damages in the amount of $5,872,36, plus interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry of this judgment to
the date of payment.
7.

Regarding Plaintiff's claim for breach of Defendant

Firemaster's fiduciary responsibility, Plaintiff shall be, and he
3

OCrcS

hereby is, granted judgnenr agams- Defendant Firemaster in the
principal sum of $1.00, plus interest at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of entry cf rhis judgment to the date of
payment.
8.

Regarding Plaincifffs claim of negligent

misrepresentation by Defendant Firenasrer, Defendant Firemaster
shall be, and it hereby is, granred a judgment of no cause of
action against the Plaintiff.
9.

Regarding Plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment by

Defendant Firemaster, Defendant Firenaster shall be, and it
hereby is, granted a judgment cf nc cause of action against the
Plaintiff.
10.

Regarding Plaintiff's claim of breach of

California Corporation Code § 31CI5 et seq., by Defendant
Firemaster, Defendant Firenasrer snail be, and it hereby is,
granted a judgment of no cause cf action against the Plaintiff.
11.

Regarding Plaintiff's claim of breach of Quasi

Contract against Defendant Fireziasrer, Defendant Firemaster shall
be, and it hereby is, granted a judgment of no cause of action
against the Plaintiff.
12.

On Plaintiff's claijn against Defendant Firemaster

for breach of the Implied Ccvenan- of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing, Plaintiff shall be, and hereby is, granted a judgment
against Defendant Firemaster in a principal sum of $50,000.00,
plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry
of this judgment to the date cf paynen~.

13.

Defendant Firemaster is granted judgment that

Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was not forced to enter into the two
Franchise Agreements under duress.
14.

Plaintiff Bard Holbrook is granted judgment that

Defendant Firemaster's actions regarding the payment of
commissions bars Defendant Firemaster from being able to enforce
the non-competition and liquidated damages provisions of the
contracts between the parties.
15.

Plaintiff Bard Holbrook is granted judgment that

the consideration the Plaintiff was to receive under the
contracts between the parties failed, thereby terminating his
obligations under such contracts.
16.

Plaintiff Bard Holbrook is granted judgment that

Defendant Firemaster waived its rights to require Plaintiff Bard
Holbrook to perform his obligations under the Territory Agreement
and Franchise Contracts as a result of Defendant Firemaster's
failure to pay commissions and provide services as set forth in
those contracts.
17.

Plaintiff Bard Holbrook is granted judgment that

Defendant Firemaster's prior failure to perform its obligations
under the contracts justified Plaintiff's refusal to continue to
perform under such contracts.
18.

Defendant Firemaster shall be and hereby is,

granted judgment against Plaintiff Bard Holbrook of no liability
to Plaintiff on the cash bond of $75,000.00 filed in connection
with the injunction in this case.
5

19,

Plaintiff shall be and hereby is, granted a

Declaratory judgment against Defendant Firemaster in that
Plaintiff is and has been lawfully excused from any further
performance under the contracts entered into between Plaintiff
and Defendant Firemaster except as specifically set forth
otherwise by the Orders of this Court.
20.

Defendant Firemaster's and Defendant Robin

Phillips' other claims for attorney fees and costs other than
those associated with their defense of Plaintiff's racketeering
claims associated with this action are denied.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that all
other claims between the parties not specifically described
herein are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

v *?

day of

//Q

(6 £ ^ .

, 1991.

BY THE COl

HONORABLE PAT BT-BR"I"
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

02C9SX

OCT 0 3 1991
JOHN T. ANDERSCN' ::.:;
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE S LJ-.ZZXEP.
Attorneys for Cefer.da-ts X==-=r Protection
Corporation and Rcrir. 2. Phillies
201 South Main Street, Suiie is::
P.O. Box 11893
Salt Lake City, U-ah
=414"-:HI
Telephone: (3C1) 5J2-i:24
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 2ZSZ7.ZCZ COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

BARD N. H0LBR0CK
]
.Plair.riff,

;

JUDGMENT ON COUNTERCLAIM
CF DEFENDANT, MASTER
PROTECTION CORPORATION,
D3A FIREMASTER

;

Civil No. 900900445CN

;

Judge Pat B. Brian

vs.
MASTER PROTECTION CCPPCPAIIC.V
dba FIREMASTER, a California
corporation; ROBIJr D. PHILLIPS;
and JOHN DOES 1-2 J,

\

Defer.iar.rs.

A jury rrial ir. rrs aicve-captioned case was conducted
on February 4, through Feir-ar*' 12, 1991, before the undersigned.
The court having suinrred

re rha jury by way of four special

verdict forms four cf rhe olaizos contained in the counterclaim of
defendant,

Master

Prcrscricr

Corporation,

dba

Firemaster

("Firemaster") , and rhe jury having completed each of the special
verdict forms, ar.o gocd cause appearing for the entry of a judgment

formally

enicdymo

rhe

jury's

special

verdicts

on

Firemaster's ccunrerclaizis, ir is hereby

0-^385

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Firemaster shall be, and it hereby is, granted

judgment against plaintiff and counterclaim defendant, Bard N.
Holbrook

("Holbrook")

on

Firemaster's

claim

that

Holbrook

breached the confidentiality provisions of that certain territory
agreement dated June 30, 1987, that certain trade secret agreement dated July 11, 1987, and those two certain franchise agreements

dated

Firemaster

April
for

11, 1988 and that

liquidated

damages

in

Holbrook
the

is liable to

principal

sum of

$10,000, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date
of entry of this judgment to the date of payment, pursuant to
paragraph 13(b) of the territory agreement and paragraph 14(c) of
the franchise agreements.
2.

Firemaster shall be, and it hereby is, granted

judgment against Holbrook on Firemaster's counterclaim for conversion in the principal sum of $5,271.47, plus interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry of this judgment to
the date of payment.
3.

Firemaster shall be, and it hereby is, granted

judgment against Holbrook for attorneys' fees and costs in the
amount of $8,124.50 incurred to defend against plaintiff's state
law racketeering claims.
4.

Holbrook shall be, and he hereby is, granted a

judgment of no cause of action against Firemaster on Firemaster's

counterclaim

for

Holbrook's

tortious

interference

with

Firemaster's existing economic relations.
5.

Holbrook shall be, and he hereby is, granted judg-

ment of no cause of action against Firemaster on Firemaster's
counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
6.

Because the Court has previously determined that

neither Firemaster nor Holbrook is the "prevailing party" for
purposes of recovery of attorneys' fees and costs, each of the
parties shall be, and they hereby are, directed to bear their own
attorneys' fees and costs.
DATED this <^3

day of October, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT ON
COUNTERCLAIM

OF

DEFENDANT

MASTER

FIREMASTER to the following on this

PROTECTION
'

day of October, 1991:

Richard N. Bigelow, Esq.
MARTIN & BIGELOW
10 East South Temple, #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

JTA/090491A

-4-

CORPORATION,

DBA

EXHIBIT 5

Tfirro JL-WICIS! Dis J I C I

FEB 1 2 1991

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINS
FIREMASTER FOR BREACH OF THE TERRITORY AGREEMENT
We the jury in the above entitled action, find the
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to
us:

QUESTION NO, 1;

Do you find that the territory agreement

constituted a valid and enforceable agreement between the
parties?
Answer Yes or No.
A n s w e r :

-

^

If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the

next question.
QUESTION NO. 2:

Do you find that the Plaintiff Bard Holbrook

fully performed his obligations under the territory agreements
prior to its termination?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

Uy^T
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this

verdict.

If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the

next question.

(\ •'* * s', «-$

QUESTION NO. 3:

Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was

lawfully excused from performing any further obligations under
the territory agreement?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

^j J?5^

0
If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 3 "yes,11 then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 4 : Do you find that Defendant Firemaster
wrongfully and without excuse or justification failed to pay
Plaintiff Bard Holbrook the commissions and provide services set
forth in Sections 4 and 8 of the territory agreement?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

^/T
If you answer Question No. 4

verdict.

lf

nofff sign and return this

If you answer Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 5:

Did Defendant Firemaster!s conduct cause

Plaintiff Bard Holbrook to suffer damages which were reasonably
foreseeable?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: L^\^ ;

*"* /-* c- **~ r- r-*

If you answer Question No. 5 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 5 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 6:

What is the total amount of all damage suffered

by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a result of Firemaster1s breaches
of the Territory Agreement?
Answer: $ T

DATED:

(?<f7, ?J

3-/>7/

^ ^ - ^ ^
Forepers^^n

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST FIREMASTER
FOR BREACH OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT NO. 1
FOR THE SALT LAKE CITY AREA
We the jury in the above entitled action, find the
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to
us:

QUESTION NO. 1:

Do you find that the Franchise Agreement No. 1

for the Salt Lake City Area constituted a valid and enforceable
agreement between the parties?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

(^Jpf
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this

verdict.

If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 2:

Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook fully

performed his obligations under the Franchise Agreement No. 1 for
the Salt Lake City Area prior to his termination with Defendant
Firemaster?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

M^*
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this

verdict.

If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO, 3:

Dc ycu find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was

lawfully excused from performing any further obligations under
the Franchise Agreement }o. 1 for the Salt Lake City area?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

( */ J
If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this

verdict.

If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 4:

Do ycu find that Defendant Firemaster wrongfully

and without excuse or jusrification failed to pay Plaintiff Bard
Holbrook the comnissicns and provide services set forth in
Section 4 and 8 of the Franchise Agreement No. 1 for the Salt
Lake City Area?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: &/- ?
If you answer Question No. 4 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 5:

Do you find that the Defendant Firemaster's

wrongful, unjustified cr unexcused conduct caused Plaintiff Bard
Holbrook to suffer damages which were reasonably foreseeable?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: i^£^

If you answer Question No. 5 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 5 "yes/1 then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 6;

What is the total amount of all damage suffered

by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a result of Firemaster"s breach of
Franchise Agreement No. 1 for the Salt Lake City Area?
Answer

$ (•&&

DATED

+~ I

^e,^/

Foreperson

O r-

r

•'•f-. ,=

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST
FIREMASTER FOR BREACH OF THE FRANCHISE AGREEMENT NO. 2
FOR THE RURAL UTAH FRANCHISE

We the jury in the above entitled action, find the
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to
us:

QUESTION NO. l:

Do you find that the Franchise Agreement No. 2

for the Salt Lake City Area constituted a valid and enforceable
agreement between the parties?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

L>-\/£
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this

verdict.

If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 2:

Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook fully

performed his obligations under the Franchise Agreement No. 2 for
the Salt Lake City Area?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

\**\ / \

If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the

next question.

/1

* •-

QUESTION NO. 3:

Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was

lawfully excused from performing his obligations under the
contracts?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: M/5^
If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer the

next question.

1

^J^
QUESTION NO. 4:

_

Do you find that I'laiilLilf Baid llurErook

wrongfully and without excuse or justification failed to pay
Plaintiff the commissions and provide services set forth in
Section 4 and 8 of the Franchise Agreement No. 2 for the Salt
Lake City Area?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

Ly/

]/^

if you answer Question No. 4 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the

next question.
QUESTION NO. 5:

Do you find that the Defendant Firemaster's

wrongful, unjustified or unexcused conduct approximately caused
Plaintiff Bard Holbrook to suffer damages which were reasonably
foreseeable?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: \A? ^

n

If you answer Question Nc. 5 *r.c," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question Nc. 3 "yes," rhen answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 6;

What is the rotal anrun- cf all damage suffered

by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a resulr cf Jirezasterfs breach of
Franchise Agreement No. 2 for the Rural Trah Franchise?
Answer

S / ^ ^

DATED

i'f>-n
Jcrecerson

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF BARD HOLBROOKfS CLAIM
AGAINST DEFENDANT FIREMASTER FOR
CONVERSION OF PLAINTIFF'S MONEY

We the jury in the above entitled action, find the
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to
us:

QUESTION NO. 1:

Did Plaintiff Bard Holbrook have an ownership

interest in money in the possession of Firemaster?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: ^ > ^ J
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 2:

Did Defendant Firemaster willfully interfere

with Plaintiff Bard Holbrookfs rights in that money without
lawful justification?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: (s\ S ^
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 3:

Was Plaintiff Bard Holbrook deprived of his

rightful use and possession of money through Defendant
Firemaster's conduct?
Answer Yes or No,

<r

Answer: LAf^>

If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this

verdict.

If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 4: What amount of damages did Plaintiff Bard
Holbrook suffer as a result of Defendant Firemasterfs improper
retention of Plaintiff Bard Holbrook1s money?
Answer

s xo.axil

QUESTION NO. 5;

By improperly retaining money to be paid

Plaintiff Bard Holbrook, did Defendant Firemaster act willfully
or in reckless violation of Plaintifffs rights?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer <>]/S
If you answer Question No. 5 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 5 "yes," then answer the

next question.

02^744

QUESTION NO. 6:

What is the total amount of punitive damages, if

any, that should be imposed against Defendant Firemaster?
Answer $ J <P~72- J£

DATED

2-s*

~^f

y^Z*
Foreperson

07:1745

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF BARD HOLBROOK!S CLAIM
OF BREECH OF FIREMASTER1S FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY

We the jury in the above entitled action, find the
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to
us:

QUESTION NO, 1:

Did Plaintiff Bard Holbrook place confidence and

trust in Defendant Firemaster by entrusting funds from sales and
service which trust and confidence accepted by Defendant
Firemaster?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

^1/S
If you answer Question No, 1 "no," sign and return this

verdict.

If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 2:

Because of the special relationship of trust and

confidence created between Plaintiff Bard Holbrook and Defendant
Firemaster, did Defendant Firemaster have influence over
Plaintiff Bard Holbrook and his property?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: LA aS
Ulf
verdict.

yc
you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this

If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 3:

Did Defendant Firemaster wrongfully employ its

uncommon influence for corporate gain?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: CyX $
If you answer Question No. 3 "no," sign and return this
verdict.

If you answer Question No. 3 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 4: Was Plaintiff Bard Holbrook damaged as a direct
and proximate consequence of Defendant Firemaster's wrongful
conduct?
Answer Yes or No.

£^kS

Answer:
It
verdict.

you answer Question No. 4 "no," sign and return this

If you answer Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 5:

What is the total amount of all damage suffered

by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a result of Defendant Firemaster's
breach of its Fiduciary Duty?
Answer:

DATED:

&-

)d~7s
Foreperson

SPECIAL VERDICTS TO JURY
QUESTION NO, 1;

Do you find that Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was

forced to enter into the two Franchise Agreements under duress?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

QUESTION NO. 2:

Do you find that Defendant Firemaster's actions

regarding the payment of commissions should bar Defendant
Firemaster from being able to enforce the Non-Competition and
liquidated damages provisions of the contracts between the
parties?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: lA/ £

QUESTION NO. 3:

Do you find that the consideration of the

Plaintiff was to receive under the contracts between the parties
failed, thereby terminating his obligations under such contracts?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

^l/S

QUESTION NO. 4:

Do you find that Defendant Firemaster waived its

rights to require Plaintiff Bard Holbrook to perform his
obligations under the territory agreement and Franchise contracts
as a result of Defendant Firemaster's failure to pay commissions
and provide services as set forth in the contracts?

0^753

Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

(^JO S

QUESTION NO. 5:

Do you find that Defendant Firemaster's prior

failure to perform their obligations under the contracts
justified Plaintiff's refusal to continue to perform under such
contracts?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer: ^1^3

(!f.£7£0

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING PLAINTIFF BARD HOLBROOK'S CLAIM
AGAINST DEFENDANT FIREMASTER FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
We the jury in the above entitled action, find the
following Special Verdict on the following questions submitted to
us:

QUESTION NO, 1:

Does Defendant Firemaster's conduct constitute a

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
that Firemaster owed to Plaintiff Bard Holbrook under the
Territory Agreement and the Franchise Agreements?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

(y\/S
If you answer Question No. 1 "no," sign and return this

verdict.

If you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then answer the

next question.

QUESTION NO. 2:

Did Plaintiff Bard Holbrook suffer injury as a

result of Defendant Firemaster's breach of its implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing?
Answer Yes or No.
Answer:

L^\y^3
If you answer Question No. 2 "no," sign and return this

verdict.

If you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then answer the

next question.

002761

QUESTION NO. 3:

What is the total amount of all damages suffered

by Plaintiff Bard Holbrook as a direct and proximate result of
Defendant Firemaster's breach of its implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing?
Answer:

Dated:

$ 5~c>/>*>*• ^>°

1~ I X-^S

^-jki^

>/^vt^-

Foreperson /

QC^L2

EXHIBIT C-

C^

1(
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JOHN T. ANDERSON (0094)
of and for
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendants Master Protection
Corporation and Robin D. Phillips
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

BARD N. HOLBROOK,
ORDER DISMISSING
RACKETEERING CLAIMS
CONTAINED IN PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.
MASTER PROTECTION CORPORATION
dba FIREMASTER, a California
corporation; ROBIN D. PHILLIPS;
and, JOHN DOES 1-20,

Civil No. 900900445CN
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

* * * * * * * *

Defendants1

motion

to

dismiss

plaintiff's

second

amended complaint dated July 25, 1990 (the "Second Amended Complaint") came on regularly for hearing before the undersigned on
September 6, 1990, at which time the court instructed plaintiff's
counsel to file a more definite statement of the racketeering
claims contained in the seventh and eighth claims of the Second
Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff subsequently filed his more defi-

nite statement dated September 21, 1990 (the "Statement"), in

001671

Ck^y

response to which defendants filed a formal written response and
renewed their previously filed motion to dismiss the racketeering
claims contained in the Second Amended Complaint.

The court con-

ducted a hearing on the sufficiency of the Statement

and the

renewal of defendants' motion to dismiss the racketeering claims
contained in the Second Amended Complaint on October 10, 1990 at
11:00 a.m.

Plaintiff was represented at the hearing by his coun-

sel, Richard N. Bigelow of Martin & Bigelow.

Defendants were

represented by their counsel, John T. Anderson of Parsons Behle &
Latimer.

The court having reviewed the complete file of plead-

ings and papers in the case, and having heard and considered the
arguments, stipulations and representations of counsel, and having

orally

announced

its

ruling

on

the

record,

and

having

requested defendants' counsel to prepare and submit formal findings consistent with its decision to dismiss the* racketeering
claims contained in the Second Amended Complaint, and good cause
appearing therefor, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.

The seventh and eighth claims for relief contained

in the Second Amended Complaint which seek to impose liability on
defendants under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, Utah
Code Ann. S 76-10-1601 et sea. ("UPUAA") and the Federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act contained in 18

-2-

001B72

U.S.C. S 1961 et. sea..

("RICO") shall be, and they hereby are,

dismissed with prejudice.
2.

In

reaching

the

foregoing

conclusion,

the

court

specifically finds that (i) the choice of law provision contained
in

paragraph

19

of

the

parties1

franchise

agreements

dated

April 11, 1988 is binding on, and enforceable by, the parties and
precludes

plaintiff

from

maintaining

>4Paoke^eeiri4^-"BBt4rvi^^
3.
dants'

right

a claim

under

ft-ICO,—

<>T

This Order shall be without prejudice
under

UPUAA* afreh

S 76-10-1605(8)

of

UPUAA

to

to defen-

recover

from

plaintiff their reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees incurred
to defend

against,

and obtain

dismissal

of, plaintiff's

UPUAA

claim.

-3-

001673

DATED this

ill

M-

H-f

day of OcLobeiv 1990
BY THE COURT:

-JUL

UUvt<»l<7

DISTRICT
JUDGE
Dl»STRI
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^V~-4^ J*>~<u^

JOHRLT. ANDERSON

RICHARD N. BIGELOW, ESQ.
382/101290A

-4-
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